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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN CLONTZ, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
HARVEY JAMES CLONTZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 860254 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. That the Trial Court did not award alimony in a 
twenty-seven (27) year marriage to the spouse that is not 
working and is disabled, constituted a manifest injustice 
contrary to Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
2. That the Trial Court abused its discretion when it 
did not award a portion of Plaintiff1s retirement benefits 
to Defendant. 
3. ' That due to the Trial Court's distribution of the 
marital assets, Defendant was not awarded alimony nor a 
portion of Plaintiff's retirement. He is therefore forced 
to sell the home awarded to him in order to distribute the 
equity awarded to Plaintiff which constitutes a manifest 
injustice contrary to Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Complaint by Plaintiff/Respondent and an 
Answer and Counterclaim by Defendant/Appellant, each seeking 
a Decree of Divorce and an equitable distribution of 
property and alimony rights. Plaintiff alleged in her 
Complaint, and Defendant, in his Answer and Counterclaim, 
that each treated the other cruelly, causing mental anguish 
and distress. 
The Honorable DAVID E. ROTH, sitting without a jury, 
granted Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce based upon the grounds 
of mental cruelty. The District Court entered an order 
regarding the distribution of property and Defendant's right 
to an alimony award. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on the 7th day of 
March, 1959, in Sunset, Davis County, Utah. There have been 
five (5) children born as issue of this marriage, but all 
children are how emancipated. (TR 93) 
Plaintiff is employed at Hill Air Force Base and her 
gross income is over Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars per 
month. (TR 103) Plaintiff has accumulated Fifteen 
Thousand, Eight Hundred Fifty-Six And Eighty-Three/100 
($15,856.83) Dollars in retirement. (TR 106) 
Defendant is medically disabled and receives Civil 
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Service disability in the amount of Six Hundred Fifty-Five 
And Forty-Eight/100 ($655.48) Dollars per month and has no 
other source of income. (TR 106) 
Defendant received an acre of land from his father, 
before his marriage to Plaintiff . (TR 107) Defendant's 
father also gave each of Defendant's siblings at this time 
an acre of land or the sum of Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollars. 
(TR 115-116) The estimated value of the land at the time it 
was distributed was Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollars. (TR 115) 
In a prior divorce proceeding, wherein a sibling of 
Defendant was divorced, the Trial Court held that this land 
in question was the sibling's separate property as it was an 
inheritance. (TR 108) 
That in 1960 a home was built by the parties upon the 
property given to Defendant. Presently, the property is 
unencumbered and the appraised value of the property is 
Sixty-One Thousand, Five Hundred ($61,500.00) Dollars. (TR 
96-108) The appraised value of the land itself is Sixteen 
Thousand ($16,000.00) Dollars. (TR 117) 
Plaintiff received between Five Thousand ($5,000.00) 
Dollars and Six Thousand ($6,000.00) Dollars from her 
parents from the proceeds of the sale of her mother's farm 
during the marriage of Plaintiff and Defendant. (TR 125) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is Defendant's position that the Trial Court abused 
its discretion contrary to U.C.A. § 30-3-5. Defendant was 
not awarded alimony nor a portion of Plaintiff's retirement 
fund which would have been equitable in view of Defendant's 
financial situation and the length of the parties' marriage. 
When the effect of this inequity is combined with the 
payment of the Court-awarded equity to Plaintiff within six 
(6) months from the date of the Order, the effect is 
evaluated, and this abuse of discretion rises to a level 
requiring a modification of the Trial Court's Order to 
ensure that a manifest injustice does not occur. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S NON-ORDER OF ALIMONY 
TO DEFENDANT INDICATES A MANIFEST INJUSTICE 
CONTRARY TO § 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953 AND 
CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
"There is no fixed formula which a 
trial judge in a divorce action must 
follow in making divisions of 
properties, but it is the prerogative of 
the Court to make whatever disposition 
it deems fair, equitable, and necessary 
for the protection and welfare of the 
parties." 
Berry v. Berry, 635 P. 2d 68 (Utah 1981). 
The Court will not disturb a Trial Court's Findings and 
Judgment merely because it might have viewed the matter 
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differently, but would do so only if it appeared that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the Trial .Court's 
findings, or that the Trial Court misapplied the law, or 
abused its discretion, so that an injustice has resulted. 
It is the Trial Court's duty to do a division of property 
and income in a divorce proceeding so that the parties may 
readjust their lives to the new situation as well as 
possible, but there is no fixed rule or formula for the 
distribution of a marital estate. Turner v. Turner, 649 P. 
2d 6 (Utah 1982). However, it is the duty and prerogative 
of the Court in equity matters, where the occasion warrants, 
and after a review of both the facts and the law , to fashion 
its own remedy as a substitution for the judgment of the 
Trial Court. Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P. 2d 1019 (Utah 
1982). 
In the present case, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion when it did not award alimony to the disabled 
husband. J In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 P. 2d 1066 (Utah 
1951), the Court held that where there are sufficient assets 
and income to do so, a wife against whom a divorce decree 
has been entered is entitled to be provided for according to 
her station in life and as demanded by her condition of 
health and lack of ability to work. The facts in the 
present case are that it is the husband who is disabled and 
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is in ill health who needs to be provided for according to 
his station in life. The MacDonald case should be applied 
regardless of the gender of the spouse and as long as the 
circumstance of lack of ability to work and the need to 
maintain the current station in life are met. This would be 
especially true in a marriage of long duration such as the 
present one. 
The Court observed in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P. 2d 144 
(Utah 1978), that: 
"...the purpose of alimony is to 
provide post-marital support; it is 
intended neither as a penalty imposed on 
the husband nor as a reward granted to 
the wife. Its function is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage to prevent 
her from becoming a public charge. 
Important criteria in delivering a 
reasonable award for support and 
maintenance are the financial conditions 
and needs of the wife, considering her 
station in life; her ability to produce 
sufficient income for herself; and the 
ability of the husband to provide 
support.I! 
In the present case, because the Trial Court did not 
award alimony, Defendant will be deprived of his home and 
other luxuries that were the culmination of the parties' 
joint efforts over the continuation of their marriage. It 
is the responsibility of the Trial Court to endeavor to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic 
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resources so that the parties might reconstruct their lives 
on a happy and useful basis. Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 
697 (Utah 1974). In a dissolution of a marriage of a 
substantial duration, the objective is that parties separate 
on as equal a basis as possible. 
In the present situation, the facts are that Plaintiff 
had a gross income of over Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars 
per month and that Defendant receives a disability 
retirement in the sum of Six Hundred Fifty-Five And 
Forty-Eight/100 ($655.48) Dollars per month. Defendant 
testified that his expenses are over One Thousand 
($1,000.00) Dollars per month. It is apparent that it will 
be impossible for Defendant to meet his financial 
obligations on his limited income alone. In English v. 
English, 565 P. 2d 409 (Utah 1977), the Court pointed out 
that the criteria considered in determining a reasonable 
award for support and maintenance include financial 
conditions and needs of the wife, ability of wife to produce 
a sufficient income for herself, and the ability of the 
husband to provide support. In the present case, the Trial 
Court specifically did not award alimony and indicated that 
if Defendant needed more money to meet his expenses he would 
have to go out and find a job. The Trial Court made this 
ruling despite uncontroverted evidence that Defendant had 
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been medically retired since 1977. 
In Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P. 2d 85 (Utah 1983), the 
Trial Court cited Gramme when the ex-wife testified at trial 
that she needed alimony to repair the roof on her home, to 
pay the utilities, and to obtain additional training so that 
she could secure a job which pays adequately. The Court 
considered her financial conditions and needs and found 
that: 
"The purpose of alimony is to 
provide support for a wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during marriage and to prevent 
her from becoming a public charge.,? 
Gramme v. Gramme, supra. 
In the present case, the facts are similar to Bushell. 
Defendant testified to his expenses, and he testified that 
he would need alimony to meet his obligations. The Trial 
Court in its summation did not award alimony and further 
found that l!to get by" Defendant would need to get a job. 
The Trial Court appears to disregard the observation of 
the Court in Gramme that alimony is not a reward, nor a 
penalty, and that an award of alimony should not be included 
as a marital asset, because it is a post-marital duty of 
support and maintenance. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 
1223 (Utah 1980). This seems especially true in light of 
the fact that the Trial Court realized that Defendant could 
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not meet his expenses without additional income of any sort. 
At the very least, it appears to be an abuse of discretion 
in that the Trial Court did not award alimony to help 
maintain Defendant's financial obligations until he could 
secure employment. In a recent Supreme Court case, Claus v. 
Claus, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (1986), the parties were married 
for approximately four and one-half (4 1/2) years before 
their separation. The Trial Court awarded alimony to the 
wife and the Court found no abuse of discretion in the Trial 
Courtfs award of twelve (12) month's alimony to provide a 
cushion to Defendant to return to a self-sustaining status. 
Both parties brought property to the marriage and the Court 
found that the wife was employable. The Claus case is 
almost exactly on point to the present case. Defendant 
needs a "cushion" until he can secure employment. 
In MacDonald, Defendant made the argument that: 
"...she was entitled to be provided 
for according to her station in life and 
as demanded by her condition of health 
and lack of ability to work; that she 
should not be cast aside in her helpless 
condition to 'sink or swim' or depend on 
others." 
The Court agreed with the argument and added that this 
was part of the continuing responsibility of the marriage 
covenant: "...in sickness, in health; for better or 
worse...", which cannot be entirely avoided, even by 
divorce. In the present case, it appears that Defendant is 
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expected to do just that. . . "sink or swimM. 
The Court found in Higley v. Higley, 676 P. 2d 379 
(Utah 1983), that an award of only One Hundred ($100.00) 
Dollars per month alimony was an abuse of discretion because 
it would not afford the wife a standard of living close to 
the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the 
marriage. This was a thirty (30) year marriage and the 
husband's gross income was Twenty-Four Thousand, Three 
Hundred Fifty-Six And Eight/100 ($24,356.80) Dollars per 
year. The Court found that the husband had the ability to 
provide permanent support in an amount greater than One 
Hundred ($100.00) Dollars per month. 
Although Defendant in this case does have another 
source of income besides Plaintiff's salary, the Court held 
in Frank v. Frank, 585 P. 2d 453 (Utah 1978), the fact that 
the divorced wife has some property or other means to 
support herself should not preclude an allowance of alimony 
if husband has far superior resources. 
In the instant case, Defendant does have a small 
income, but as stated before, the Trial Court realized that 
it was not enough for Defendant "to get by". In Frank, the 
Trial Court's memorandum decision stated as follows: 
"...It is true that the plaintiff 
through enterprise and perhaps 
necessity, does have a far better income 
than the average wife this Court sees. 
Moreover, the Court acknowledges that in 
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one sense plaintiff does not need 
alimony in that she could probably 
subsist without it, and in fact, has 
done so for approximately the last two 
years. However, and despite the 
foregoing, the Court feels wholly 
justified in making the alimony award it 
has and believes this award is amply 
supportable under guidelines laid down 
in numerous decisions of our Supreme 
Court. In making that award the Court 
has considered, among other things, (1) 
the length of this marriage, (2) 
plaintiff's assistance to defendant 
during the lean years from June 1955 to 
1970 and during which defendant prepared 
himself for his present profession of 
cardiovascular surgery and particularly, 
(3) the present disparity in the 
plaintiff's and defendant's income and 
the disparity in their income 
potential.If 
Frank v. Frank, supra. 
Defendant appealed this award of alimony upon the 
statement: n...that in one sense plaintiff does not need 
alimony.11 The Court denied Defendant's appeal and wondered: 
"...How the defendant, or any one 
on his behalf, could even suggest that a 
wife who had devoted 21 years of her 
marriage and reared a family should be 
turned out to subsist on her own is as 
discordant to our sense of justice as it 
was to the trial judge. The second is 
that notwithstanding the remark just 
referred to, the judge continued on, 
stating that he 'feels wholly justified 
in making the alimony award' and 
proceeded to enunciate the factors he 
properly considered in such 
justification." 
Frank v. Frank, supra. 
Further, the Court found that the fact that Plaintiff 
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has some property or other means to support herself should 
not preclude an allowance where the husband had far superior 
resources. 
In the present case, if the Frank alimony guidelines 
are taken into account by the Court, it will find that the 
parties have a twenty-seven (27) year marriage, as opposed 
to the Frank's twenty-one (21) year marriage; that a 
disparity in the incomes are present because Plaintiff is 
gainfully employed and Defendant is receiving a disability 
income; that this disparity will be continuing because 
Defendant's income potential is low due to a permanent 
disability since 1977; and lastly, Plaintiff's resources are 
far superior to Defendant's because Plaintiff's income is 
over three (3) times greater than Defendant's monthly 
disability allotment. The Trial Court should have 
considered the Frank criteria and awarded Defendant a 
reasonable sum of alimony for a reasonable period of time. 
The fact that the Trial Court realized that Defendant 
needed additional income ffto get by", constituted a manifest 
injustice contrary to § 30-3-5 at the U.C.A. In Delatore v. 
Delatore, 680 P. 2d 27 (Utah 1984), the Trial Court found 
that the wife was employable and had actually worked during 
part of the marriage. Although the marriage was of short 
duration, just three and one-half (3 1/2) years, the Trial 
Court awarded alimony for a period of twenty-four (24) 
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months and the Court again upheld this award. 
In light of the non-award of alimony and the preceding 
case law, it is evident that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion and Defendant should be entitled to an award of 
alimony. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
RETIREMENT INDICATES A MANIFEST INJUSTICE CONTRARY 
TO § 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953 AND CONSTITUTES 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
In this divorce action, the Trial Court did not 
consider Plaintiff1s retirement fund as a marital asset to 
be divided between the parties. In Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P. 2d 
1308 (Utah 1982), the Court cited Englert v. Englert, 576 P. 
2d 1279 (Utah 1978), and held that the Trial Courtfs duty to 
make an equitable division of property in a divorce action: 
11
. .. encompasses all of the assets 
of every nature possessed by the 
parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived; and that this 
includes any such pension fund or 
insurance.'1 
The Trial Court should have awarded a portion of 
Plaintiff1s retirement fund to Defendant as a marital asset 
although Plaintiff has not yet retired and her actual 
enjoyment of this benefit is purely prospective. The value 
of Plaintiff1s retirement is Fifteen Thousand, Eight Hundred 
Fifty-Six And Eighty-Three/100 ($15,856.83) Dollars, and 
Defendant should be entitled to one-half (1/2) of this 
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amount as of the date of the divorce. In Dogu the Court 
held that TIAA and CREF accounts, a Keogh account, and a 
pension and profit-sharing trust were marital assets and 
that the Trial Court was required to consider these in its 
determination of an equitable property division between the 
parties. 
As the Court said in DeRose v. DeRose, 426 P. 2d 221, 
222 (Utah 1967): 
lf[W]hile the determinations of the 
trial court are given deference and not 
disturbed lightly, changes should be 
made if that seems essential to the 
accomplishment of the desired objectives 
of the decree: that is, to make such an 
arrangement of the property and economic 
resources of the parties that they will 
have the best possible opportunity to 
reconstruct their lives on a happy and 
useful basis for themselves and their 
children.11 
The present case appears to be such a case. The 
equitable thing to do would be to award Defendant his share 
of Plaintiff1s retirement benefits and offset this amount 
against Plaintiff's share of the Trial Court's determined 
equity of the marital property. 
In the Trial Courtfs summation, the Court appeared to 
find that Defendant's right to receive Civil Service 
Disability income offsets his entitlement to Plaintiff's 
retirement as a marital asset. There are flaws in the Trial 
Court's reasoning because of several factors. First of all, 
Defendant's right to receive his disability income at this 
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point in his life would more appropriately be considered an 
income or earnings on a monthly basis. He is accruing no 
retirement benefits at this time, nor is he in a financial 
position to put any money aside to build a nest egg or to 
save for emergencies. He is merely existing on this limited 
amount of money. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, is earning not only a 
substantial monthly salary, but accruing retirement benefits 
at the same time. Her retirement fund is growing, and the 
size of her paycheck makes it possible for her to save 
additional sums or to put away for unforeseen expenses. 
Hence, awarding Defendant one-half (1/2) of Plaintiff's 
retirement fund which has accrued to date should not be 
offset against Defendant's disability retirement because at 
this point in time he has accrued no retirement fund per se, 
he only has the right to receive the income as long as he is 
disabled. 
Looking at civil service benefits from Plaintiff's 
view, typically inherent in Civil Service Disability 
benefits are the surviving spouse's rights to these benefits 
upon the death of the party eligible to receive them. Title 
5 U.S.C.S. 8341 (1980). Defendant's portion of the 
disability pay is set aside each month for the surviving 
spouse. Viewed in this light, Plaintiff would herself be 
entitled to this "marital asset" of Defendant's civil 
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service disability regardless of any amount of retirement 
she has accrued herself. (Of course, taking into 
consideration that if Plaintiff is divorced from Defendant, 
she would not receive any benefits upon Defendant's death. 
This argument is presented only to show the inequity of the 
Trial Court!s findings and the disparity between the 
treatment of the two (2) different retirement types, and the 
fact that Defendant, if still married to Plaintiff at the 
time of her death would not necessarily be entitled to her 
accrued retirement benefits, as she would be to his.) 
It is inequitable that Plaintiff has an inherent right 
to Defendant's benefits if married; yet, on the other hand, 
in the Trial Court's view Defendant does not have the 
absolute right to property accrued during the marriage 
either at the death of Plaintiff if still married, or in 
divorce where the property is typically divided between the 
parties at the time the marriage is terminated. 
Secondly, the Trial Court indicated that Defendant's 
civil service disability or his right to receive it has a 
value: 
M
...upwards of around Fifty 
Thousand ($50,000.00) Dollars..." 
(TR 136) 
The Court further indicated that it would not "charge11 
Defendant for this valued amount, and it will offset the 
parties' right to the two (2) retirements against each 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT - Page 16 of 20 Pages 
other's retirement. Again, the Trial Court does not take 
into consideration that Defendant's disability income is his 
only income and he is not accruing retirement, while 
Plaintiff is earning three (3) times what Defendant is 
making, and accruing retirement at the same time. 
Appropriately, the Trial Court should offset Plaintiff's 
salary against Defendant's disability income. Plaintiff 
should be "charged" the full value of her gross income of 
upwards of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars per month, 
because in the six and one-half (6 1/2) years it would take 
Defendant to have received the Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00), 
that the Trial Court has assigned as the value of 
Defendant's disability income, Plaintiff would have earned 
more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand ($150,000.00) Dollars, 
and also accrued additional retirement benefits on top of 
that. 
In the interest of equity, it seems only fair that the 
Trial Court should have ordered Defendant entitled to the 
sum of Seven Thousand, Nine Hundred Twenty-Eight And 
Forty-Two/100 ($7,928.42) Dollars, which represents his 
share of Plaintiff's retirement benefits accrued during the 
twenty-seven (27) year marriage. 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
THE COURT-DETERMINED EQUITY IN THE MARITAL HOME OF 
TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ($23,250.00) 
DOLLARS TO PLAINTIFF AND ITS PAYMENT BY 
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DEFENDANT WITHIN SIX (6) MONTHS THEREFROM IS 
A MANIFEST INJUSTICE CONTRARY TO § 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953 
While determinations of the Trial Court are given 
deference and not disturbed lightly, changes should be made 
if that seems essential to accomplishment of desired 
objectives of divorce decree; i.e., to make such an 
arrangement of the property and economic resources of the 
parties that they will have the best possible opportunity to 
reconstruct their lives on a happy mutual basis for 
themselves and their children. Dogu v. Dogu, supra. 
In the present case, because of the Trial Court award 
of equity to Plaintiff in the amount of Twenty-Three 
Thousand, Two Hundred Fifty ($23,250.00) Dollars and its 
payment by Defendant to Plaintiff within six (6) months, 
Defendant is forced to sell or mortgage his home. The award 
and time frame are especially unjust if Defendant is not 
able to mortgage his home, which is most likely in view of 
his limited income situation and his monthly obligations. 
There is little possibility that a lending institution would 
consider financing a loan for Defendant in view of 
Defendant's precarious financial situation in that his bills 
vastly exceed his income. Defendant's only other 
alternative would be to sell the home. The sale of this 
home which sits upon land given to Defendant by his father 
prior to his marriage to Plaintiff, seems particularly 
unjust and inequitable because the Trial Court has failed to 
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give sufficient weight and consideration to Defendant's 
financial situation and has left Defendant with no 
alternatives in regard to the Order which was placed upon 
Defendant by the Trial Court itself. 
In the Gramme case, the Court found that the 
responsibility of the Trial Court is to endeavor to provide 
a just and equitable adjustment of the parties1 economic 
recourses. In the present case, Defendant is deprived of 
his home and indeed is left to nsink or swim1' by the Trial 
Court's award of equity to Plaintiff and its payment of same 
within six (6) months. Defendant's financial circumstances 
should have been a consideration of the Trial Court when 
making its Order. If the Trial Court did consider 
Defendant's circumstances, when making the Order, then an 
abuse of discretion must be found. But, on the other hand, 
if the Trial Court did not consider Defendant's finances in 
making its Order, then a serious inequity has resulted and a 
modification must be implemented. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to the Court, that the Trial Court 
entering a Decree of Divorce and distributing the marital 
assets and making an alimony award abused its discretion by 
not awarding alimony to Defendant. Further, the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in not awarding Defendant one-half 
(1/2) of the property interest of Plaintiff's retirement. 
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Lastly, there was a manifest injustice in regard to 
Defendant when the Trial Court required Defendant to give 
Plaintiff her share of the Court determination of equity in 
the marital home within a six (6) months period from the 
Order. The Court is vested with the authority to review the 
matter and determine an equitable apportionment of the 
marital property and grant Defendant a reasonable alimony 
award, as well as offsetting Defendant's share of 
Plaintiff's retirement against the equity due on the home to 
Plaintiff. It is respectfully requested that this matter be 
remanded back to the District Court for trial on the merits 
and a determination of the above-mentioned alimony and 
property rights of Defendant pursuant to § 30-3-5 U.C.A. 
DATED this ffU- day of August, 1986. 
fully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I have mailed four (4) copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELIAip^irT^lHie U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid and addressed I to the Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Pete N.^Zlahos Vlahos & Sharp, Legj 
Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avetm^y/O^deA, Utah 8440J 
this /f^r-day of August, 1986 
Defendant/Appella 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. , #3337 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN CLONTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARVEY JAMES CLONTZ, 
Defendant. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 92534 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
25th day of March, 1986, before the Honorable David E. Roth,, 
one of the Judges of the above entitled Court sitting with-
out a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and with 
her attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appearing in 
person and with his attorney, John Blair Hutchison, and it 
having been shown that the Defendant was duly served with a 
copy of a Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and wherein 
the Defendant filed his responsive pleadings, and each of 
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the parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, proffers of proof having been made to the Court in 
chambers concerning several items, that exhibits having been 
offered and received, and the Court being fully cognizant of 
all matters pertaining therein, enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff has been a resident of Weber County, 
State of Utah for at least three (3) months prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 
Sunset, Utah on the 7th day of March, 1959, and ever since 
said time have been and still are husband and wife; that 
there has been born as issue of this marriage five (5) 
children, and that all five (5) children are now emanci-
pated . 
3. That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff cruel-
m 
ly, causing her great mental distress and anguish, in that 
the Defendant has been argumentative, has threatened the 
Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff is fearful of the Defen-
dant. 
4. That during the course of the marriage, the parties 
herein have acquired an equity in a home located at 3867 
West 2700 South in Syracuse, Utah, and the Court finds that 
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the land and home have a value of $61,500.00; that the Court 
finds that the land was given to the Defendant and can be 
traced, and at the time of the giving back in 1962, had a 
value of $600.00, that the present value of the land is 
$16,000.00, but there has been $1,000.00 worth of improve-
ment on the land. 
5. That the parties, during the course of the marri-
age, have acquired personal property as evidenced by the 
exhibit introduced in Court, and in addition, the Plaintiff 
has a 1983 Mercury automobile, which has a fair market value 
of $7,500.00, with a mortgage balance of $3,100.00, having a 
net equity of $4,400.00; that the Defendant has a 1985 GMC 
4x4 truck having a value of $10,000.00, with a mortgage 
balance of $7,632.00, leaving an equity of $2,368.00; and 
that the Plaintiff has purchased a mobile home since the 
parties separated, and that the mobile home has an equity of, 
approximately $300.00. 
6. That during the course of the marriage, the parties 
herein have incurred certain debts, to-wit: Approximately 
$18,500.00 due and owing on the trailer Plaintiff purchased 
since the parties separated, approximately $3,100.00 due and 
owing on the 1983 Mercury automobile, approximately 
$7,632.00 due and owing on the 1985 GMC truck, and that the 
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parties have incurred debts and obligations since they 
separated. 
7. That the Plaintiff is employed at Hill Air Force 
Base and has a retirement; and that the Defendant is pre-
sently retired and receives income in excess of $650.00 per 
month, and the Court finds that the vested retirement of the 
Plaintiff and the present value of the Defendant's right to 
receive the retirement is far in excess of the $15,000.00 
that the Plaintiff has vested; that the Court believes that 
if a present value was placed on the Defendant's retirement, 
it would be somewhere around $50,000.00. 
8. That the Court finds that the Defendant is employ-
able, in fact, the Defendant has been employed in the past, 
that he is presently looking for work and will have to find 
employment if he needs more than the $650.00 retirement. 
9. That during the course of the marriage, the parties, 
herein have also acquired thirteen (13) $25.00 face value 
U.S. Sav i ngs Bonds . 
10. That the Court finds that each of the parties has 
submitted lists showing the value of items of property, 
which are drastically different in valuation, including the 
drastic difference in the diamonds and miscellaneous jewelry 
that Plaintiff has, and the Court finds that the value of 
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Plaintiff's jewelry is equivalent to the value of the Defen-
dant's guns, and the Court finds there is about $600.00 or 
$700.00 valuation on each side concerning those items. 
11. That the Court finds that in comparing the two (2) 
lists, the only real item that appears to be in dispute is 
the Zenith television set requested by the Plaintiff. 
12. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff received 
money from her inheritance, which she has kept in a separate 
account and also has a joint account with her mother, which 
is not a marital asset, and that the Defendant had a savings 
account in his name, which was depleted from approximately 
$6,000.00 down to about $400.00. 
13. That the Defendant has incurred attorney fees and 
costs in the sum of $800.00. 
14. That the Plaintiff will maintain health and acci-
dent insurance for the Defendant if it is available through^ 
her place of employment. 
From the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff, Kathleen Clontz, is entitled to 
a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Harvey James Clontz, 
said divorce to become final upon the signing and entry. 
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2. That the Plaintiff shall be awarded a lien in the 
family home in the sum of $23,250.00, said lien is deter-
mined by the Court as follows: That the Defendant shall be 
awarded the first $15,000.00 from the total value of the 
home, which is $61,500.00, which was from the Defendant's 
father and had a value of $600.00 when it was given to the 
Defendant back in 1962, and the $1,000.00 has been improve-
ments, so that the appraised value of the land, which was 
$1,600.00 will be reduced to $1,500.00, leaving a net equity 
of $46,500.00, with Plaintiff to receive $23,250.00. 
3. That Plaintiff is entitled to receive her money 
from the home within six (6) months and he must either 
mortgage the home to pay the Plaintiff or sell it, but must 
cash her out within six (6) months. 
4. That each of the parties are awarded their own 
individual reti rements. 
5. That neither party is awarded any alimony. 
6. That Plaintiff is awarded her house trailer, sub-
ject to the existing mortgage; the 1983 Mercury automobile, 
subject to the mortgage balance; and those checking and 
savings accounts in her name and in the name of Plaintiff's 
mother. 
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7. That the Defendant is awarded his 1985 GMC 4x4 
truck, subject to the indebtedness and those savings and 
checking -iccbuntb in his name. 
8. That Plaintiff is to receive those items set forth 
in her exhibit, plus those additional items that Defendant 
in his exhibit is willing to give to the Plaintiff, and the 
Defendant shall receive those items on his list, plus those 
additional items that Plaintiff is willing to give him. 
9. That the items awarded to the Plaintiff are as 
follows: Zenith television, old poster bed with dresser, 
five (5) Big 0 tires, two (2) snow tires on rims, wrought 
iron bed belonging to Plaintiff's grandmother, cedar chest, 
rain lamp, antique sewing machine, cream separater, milk can 
belonging to grandparents, portapote, round mirror, swan 
mirror belonged to grandparents, stereo-record combination, 
one-half (%) of the dishes, ma erame, suitcases, hair dryer 
rug with Indian dolls, crafts that Plaintiff has made, two 
(2) statues, toy box made by Plaintiff's father, personal 
belongings, cuckoo clock and/or cocke^ clock given to Plain-
tiff by her sister, bug killer, knick-knacks, three (3) 
drawer cabinet, stereo-record player combination, one-half 
ih) of the picture albums of the children, diamonds and 
miscellaneous jewelry, glue gun, lamp, rocking chair, micro-
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wave oven and stand, kitchen utensils in Plaintiff's posses-
sion, couch sold " by Plaintiff to the parties' daughter, 
computer and those items of property she has in her posses-
sion. 
10. That the Defendant shall be awarded the 1985 GMC 
4x4 truck, 16 horse power garden tractor, caterpillar, 
landscaping trailer, tent trailer, fishing boat with motor, 
the inoperative Zenith television with the operative Zenith 
television awarded to the Plaintiff, clothes washer and 
dryer, fan and kitchen appliances, kitchen utensils in 
possession, kitchen dining room set, rifles and rounds of 
ammunition, deep freeze, refrigerator, couch, wood burning 
stove, RCA television, camp trailer and supplies, blond 
bedroom set, waterbed, extra dresser and chest of drawers, 
kitchen set hardwood or maple, Defendant's tools, telescope, 
power head to Rainbow vacuum and his personal belongings. 
11. That the Plaintiff shall be awarded the thirteen 
(13) U.S. Savings Bonds, however they are to be divided 
equally in value, with Plaintiff to determine the value of 
the bonds and one-half (%) the value to be awarded to the 
Defendant, and that the total value of the thirteen (13) 
bonds is $410.06, of which the Defendant is entitled to 
$205.03. 
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12. That the Plaintiff is entitled to pick up the items 
awarded to her on Saturday, April 12, 1986, at 10:00 a.m. 
13. That Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant's attor-
ney, John Blair Hutchison, the sum of $800.00, and said sum 
has been paid in full. 
DATED this day of April, 1986. 
^HN BLAIR HUTCH I SOI 
torney for Defendant 
DAVID E. ROTH, 
District Court Judge 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. , #3337 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN CLONTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARVEY JAMES CLONTZ, 
Defendant. 
/ DECREE OF DIVORCE 
/ 
/ Civil No. 92534 
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This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
25th day of March, 1986, before the Honorable David E. Roth 
one of the Judges of the above entitled Court sitting with-
out a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and with 
her attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appearing in 
person and with his attorney, John Blair Hutchison, and it 
having been shown that the Defendant was duly served with a 
copy of a Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and wherein 
the Defendant filed his responsive pleadings, and each of 
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the parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, proffers of proof having been made to the Court in 
chambers concerning several items, that exhibits having been 
offered and received, and the Court being fully cognizant of 
all matters pertaining therein, and having made its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, separately stated in writ-
ing, NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff, Kathleen Clontz, is granted a 
Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Harvey James Clontz, 
said divorce to become final upon the signing and entry. 
2. That th.e Plaintiff is awarded a lien in the family 
home in the sum of $23,250.00, said lien is determined by 
the Court as follows: That the Defendant is awarded the 
first $15,000.00 from the total value of the home, which is 
$61,500.00, which was from the Defendant's father and had a 
value of $600.00 when it was given to the Defendant back in 
1962, and the $1,0 00.00 has been improvements, so that the 
appraised value of the land, which was $1,600.00 will be 
reduced to $1,500.00, leaving a net equity of $46,500.00, 
with Plaintiff to receive $23,250.00. 
3. That Plaintiff is entitled to receive her money 
from the home within six (6) months and he must either 
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mortgage the home to pay the Plaintiff or sell it, but must 
cash her out within six (6) months. 
4. That each of the parties are awarded their own 
individual retirements. 
5. That neither party is awarded any alimony. 
6. That Plaintiff is awarded her house trailer, sub-
ject to the existing mortgage; the 1983 Mercury automobile, 
subject to the mortgage balance; and those checking and 
savings accounts in her name and in the name of Plaintiff's 
mother. 
7. That the Defendant is awarded her 1985 GMC 4x4 
truck, subject to the indebtedness and those savings and 
checking accounts in his name. 
8. That Plaintiff is to receive those items set forth 
in her exhibit, plus those additional items that Defendant 
in his exhibit is willing to give to the Plaintiff, and thq, 
Defendant shall receive those items on his list, plus those 
additional items that Plaintiff is willing to give him. 
9. That the items awarded to the Plaintiff are as 
follows: Zenith television, old poster bed with dresser, 
five (5) Big 0 tires, two (2) snow tires on rims, wrought 
iron bed belonging to Plaintiff's grandmother, cedar chest, 
rain lamp, antique sewing machine, cream separater, milk can 
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belonging to grandparents, portapote, round mirror, swan 
mirror belonged to grandparents, stereo-record combination, 
one-half [%) of the dishes, macrame, suitcases, hair dryer, 
rug with Indian dolls, crafts that Plaintiff has made, two 
(2) statues, toy box made by Plaintiff's father, personal 
belongings, cuckoo clock and/or cocker clock given to Plain-
tiff by her sister, bug killer, knick-knacks, three (3) 
drawer cabinet, stereo-record player combination, one-half 
{H) of the picture albums of the children, diamonds and 
miscellaneous jewelry, glue gun, lamp, rocking chair, micro-
wave oven and stand, kitchen utensils in Plaintiff's posses-
sion, couch sold by Plaintiff to the parties' daughter, 
computer and those items of property she has in her posses-
sion. 
10. That the Defendant is awarded the 1985 GMC 4x4 
truck, 16 horse power garden tractor, caterpillar, landscap-
ing trailer, tent trailer, fishing boat with motor, the 
inoperative Zenith television with the operative Zenith 
television awarded to the Plaintiff, clothes washer and 
dryer, fan and kitchen appliances, kitchen utensils in 
possession, kitchen dining room set, rifles and rounds of 
ammunition, deep freeze, refrigerator, couch, wood burning 
stove, RCA television, camp trailer and supplies, blond 
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bedroom set, waterbed, extra dresser and chest of drawers, 
kitchen set hardwood or maple, Defendant's tools, telescope, 
power head to Rainbow vacuum and his personal belongings. 
11. That the Plaintiff is awarded the thirteen (13) 
U.S. Savings Bonds, however they are to be divided equally 
in value, with Plaintiff to determine the value of the bonds 
and one-half {h) the value to be awarded to the Defendant, 
and that the total value of the thirteen (13) bonds is 
$410.06, of which the Defendant is entitled to $205.03. 
12. That the Plaintiff is entitled to pick up the items 
awarded to her on Saturday, April 12, 1986, at 10:00 a.m. 
13. That Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant's attor-
ney, John Blair Hutchison, the sum of $800.00, and said sum 
has been paid in full. 
DATED this day of April, 1986. 
DAVID E. ROTH, 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO /F/3RM: 
/JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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